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Abstract
This study investigated the psychometric risk perception between lay people and security practitioners towards terrorist
attack against Singaporean educational institutions. Being located in Southeast Asia, Singapore is not immune to
terrorist attacks from rebels found in the region. To promote fear and chaos, terrorists have begun to attack private and
neutral institutions in order to promote their cause. Mosques, hospitals and other such institutions are no longer
immune from terrorist attacks. The psychometric risk paradigm offers a basis for examining empirical views towards
potential terrorist attack against such institutions. Survey data in comparing terrorist attack against Singapore’s
educational institutions with five other criminal activities were collected from two cohorts of 100 college students
(considered as lay people) and 100 security practitioners. The study demonstrated that the students had a higher risk
perception when compared to the security practitioners that terrorist attack against educational institutions in
Singapore could occur, resulting in increased levels of dread and reduced feelings of control. Findings from the study
supported previous studies that, in particular, there are differences between lay and practitioners views of risk, with
practitioners’ generally rating risk lower than lay people.
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INTRODUCTION

The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre Twin Towers in New York on the 11th September, 2001,
indicates that today terrorists’ strategies, motivations, objectives, modus operandi and targeting have
radically changed. In particular, the pervasive use of suicide bombings against innocent civilians, in
advancing their multifaceted cause. Soft sites appear to be targets of attacks, as seen in recent years
educational institutions are not spared from these attacks. From day-care centres to universities, all have the
potential to be targeted by terrorist (Dorn & Dorn, 2006, p. 31).
In order for policy makers to apply appropriate security mitigation strategies, understanding risk perception is
important. Everyone in their daily lives is exposed to risk and how people perceive risk, results to some degree in their
decisions-making. People are generally less acceptable of risk if it is imposed by external factors over which they have
no control. Several studies (Siegrist, Cvetkovich & Roth, 2000; Siegrist, 2000) have shown that understanding of
people’s perceptions of risk is important in order to make sound policy decisions.
The study analysed the understanding of the public’s risk perception on terrorist attack against educational institutions
located in Singapore, with the use of the psychometric risk as the theoretical framework. The study observed whether
risk perception differed between the two selected cohorts, defined as lay people and security practitioners. Such
information may assist government, security industry and academia to better understand the risk perception of their
citizens, resulting in more suitable communication to the public.
In the study, the following Research Questions were considered:
1. What are the risk perceptions of Singaporeans regarding terrorist attack against educational institution?
2. Are there any significant differences in risk perceptions between the students and security personnel?

PERCEPTION OF TERRORISM
There have been a number of international surveys involving perceptions of terrorism risk. Burns (2007) presented eight
US studies relevant to the threat of terrorism. One of these asked respondents how likely and serious certain types of
terrorist attacks may appear, for example airline hijacking, attack on public transportation, deliberate contamination of
the food supply and release of a chemical or biological agent. The findings revealed that the respondents have
substantial concerns about future terrorist attacks and that they would be willing to support policies that commit
considerable resources to prevent future attack.
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Holmberg and Weibull (2002) surveyed the Swedish population, finding that terrorism was the third most worrying
threat. Another Swedish study by Bennulf (cited in Sjöberg, 2004) asked about worry and found terrorism ranked third.
In that study, all the threats and hazards were concerned with violence and various life-threatening hazards, with no
economic risks or other social risks mentioned. Nevertheless, Sjöberg (2004) found that in a study by Stutz (2002)
demonstrated that the high level of perceived threat from terrorism among the Swedish public a year earlier had faded.
On 7th May 2009, the Singapore Today newspaper (Yeo, 2009) published a poll of 100 Singaporeans on “how
concerned are you that a terrorist attack ... will happen in Singapore.” The Poll revealed that 52% expressed extreme
concern or concern, while 33% expressed unconcerned or were extremely unconcerned that a terrorist attack will
happen in Singapore. Such results appeared to indicate that Singaporeans were aware that they could be exposed to a
terrorist attack. In the same news article it was highlighted that although Singaporeans had not experienced any major
incidents, they were aware of the security threats around them due to the awareness instilled in them by Government
(Yeo, 2009). It is important to note that terrorism’s future orientation highlights the importance of understanding how
people respond to threats, as well as to actual incidents. The psychological study of risk provides insight into how
people may react to the threat of terrorism (Jenkin, 2006).

PSYCHOMETRIC RISK
Psychometric theory of risk is a quantitative methodology of the study of human behaviour (Brooks, 2003, p. 20). It was
Slovic (1992) who developed a method, which was termed the psychometric paradigm to study the risk perception of
risk to certain activities and technologies. The origin of the psychometric paradigm is the expressed preferences
approach developed by Starr (1969), which was developed as a method of weighting technological risks against
benefits.
Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read and Combs (1978) proposed a psychometric model of risk perception that initiated
the psychometric risk paradigm. The authors compiled nine dimensions and asked people to rate the risk of 30 activities
on each of the two dimensions. The nine dimensions were (1) voluntariness, (2) immediacy, (3) know to exposed, (4)
known to science, (5) controllability, (6) newness, (7) chronic, (8) common/dread, and (9) severity of consequences.
This psychometric research approach “has been used to study a broad range of hazards, including technological risks,
activities, and food hazards” (Siegrist, Keller, Kastenholz, Frey & Wiek, 2007, p. 60).
As explained by Brooks (2003, p. 40), the construct of risk perception may be measured by two risk factors, being the
sense of dread and the sense of familiarity. The measure of each factor defined the perceived level of perceived risk
towards certain activities or technologies (Figure 1).

Figure 1 Psychometric risk perception factor model
(Brooks, 2003, p. 40)
Through factor analysis, the two factors familiarity of risk and dread risk presented the underlying pattern of intercorrelations among the judged variables (Figure 2). Such studies (Slovic & Webb, 2002) exhibited the two factor
analytical representation of 81 different activities and technologies, with factor one axis being defined as low dread risk
to high dread risk while factor two axes being defined as unfamiliar risk to familiar risk.
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Figure 2 Psychometric paradigm: spatial locality of 81 hazards
(Revised from Slovic & Weber, 2002, p. 11)
The two risk factors can be further expanded into the 18 characteristics of risk; however, for the purpose of this study,
only nine of the 18 risk characteristics were tested (Table 1).
Factor 2 – Dread risk
Low dread
Dread
Controllable
Uncontrollable
Increasing
Decreasing
Individual
Catastrophic
Voluntary
Involuntary

Factor 2 – Familiar risk
Familiar
Unfamiliar
Know to those exposed
Unknown to those exposed
Old risk
New risk
Effect immediate
Effect delay

Table 1 The study’s nine measured characteristics
(Revised from Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 2000, p. 142)
Although psychometric risk has been successfully applied to single hazards, Slovic (1987) cautioned against
representing complex events as a single homogenous data point. While terrorism has been considered as a single hazard
in previous psychometric studies, the complexity and relevance of terrorism in today’s society merits an empirical
exploration of terrorism (Jenkin, 2006).
Layman and expert differences
Psychometric studies have shown that “perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable” and the “psychometric techniques
seem well suited for identifying similarities and differences among groups with regard to perception and attitudes”
(Slovic, 2000, p. 223). Therefore, the concept of risk is subjective and means different things to different people. One of
the most significant findings within the psychometric paradigm is how lay people and experts distinguish between
perceived and actual risk. “There is a mismatch in perception between the layperson and the industry expert” (Brooks,
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2003, p. 21). Experts — and, consequently the policymakers who ask for expert advice — based their risk ratings on the
expected number of fatalities. Lay people, in contrast, have a richer definition of risk (Marris, Langford, Saunderson &
O’Riordan, 1997, p. 303) and consider a heuristic approach.
“The way people perceive risk, or risk perception, can be characterized as a battleground of strong and conflicting
views” (Slovic, 1992, p. 54). As a result, conflicts may occur over the different definitions of risk concepts held by lay
people and experts. Slovic (cited in Jenkin, 2006) explained such a discrepancy by concluding that experts view risk as
the likelihood of actual harm based on mortality estimates, whereas lay perceptions of risk are based on a number of
qualitative (and subjective) characteristics (p. 2).
STUDY DESIGN
A convenience sampling of students (n=100) and security practitioners (n=100) participated in the survey, which
comprised of two parts. In the first part, the participants were asked to provide some demographic information, such as
age, gender and occupation. In the second part, the nine risk perception characteristics (Table 1) were developed into
questions and the participants asked to indicate their risk perceptions, based on the seven-point semantic differential
scale (Figure 3). Five criminal activities, namely murder, kidnapping, armed robbery, rioting and burglary, together
with terrorist attack against an educational institution were listed. Participants were asked to indicate their level of risk
perception by marking the scale position.
Criminal Activity 1 - Murder
Low Dread

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

High Dread

Criminal Activity 2 - Kidnapping
Low Dread 1 2

3

4

5

6

7

High Dread

Criminal Activity 3 - Armed Robbery
Low Dread 1 2 3

4

5

6

7

High Dread

Criminal Activity 4 - Rioting
Low Dread 1

4

5

6

7

High Dread

Criminal Activity 5 - Burglary (house breaking)
Low Dread 1 2 3 4 5

6

7

High Dread

2

3

Criminal Activity 6 - Terrorist attack against educational institution
Low Dread 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 High Dread
Figure 3 Survey questionnaire using the risk characteristics
Target population
For this study, the study considered lay people and security practitioners who lived in Singapore and were ≥16 years old
at the time of the survey. The sample population of lay people (n=100) were junior college students. Junior college
students are post secondary students mainly in the age group of 18 to 19 years old preparing for the GCE ‘A’ levels
examinations after two years of pre-university studies. The sample for security practitioners (n=100) consisted of full
time qualified security personnel from local security agencies. Security personnel were chosen, as they have some
cognisance and training in the area of terrorism and criminal activities. A particular security agency was selected for
data collection, as all security personnel in Singapore have to undergo the Singapore Workforce Skills Qualification in
security and thus there is some confidence that the sample accurately represented the security population.

DATA ANALYSIS
Data were analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) package. Descriptive statistics were
generated to provide a risk profile for each of the sample cohorts, with independent t-test conducted to determine
significance of the various risk perceptions.
Risk characteristics
The mean (M) and standard deviation (SD) for each of the risk characteristics were calculated (Table 2) by averaging all
respondents (N=200) for the six criminal activities.
Characteristic

Dread
Control
Decrease of risk
Catastrophic

Murder

Kidnapping

Armed Robbery

Rioting

Burglary

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Terrorist
Attack
Mean
SD

5.19
4.63
4.30
2.84

1.69
1.86
1.49
1.87

4.92
4.16
3.62
2.81

1.77
1.77
1.48
1.77

4.65
3.93
4.20
3.20

1.51
1.73
1.42
1.77

4.19
3.71
3.62
5.06

1.65
1.78
1.64
1.63

4.32
3.17
4.24
2.87

1.59
1.75
1.42
1.48

5.33
4.77
4.20
6.09

1.82
1.78
1.81
1.43
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Voluntary
Risk knowledge
Severity conseq
Oldness/newness
Impact
Perceived risk

3.92
3.04
5.51
2.54
2.63
5.43

2.08
1.80
1.65
1.88
1.63
1.63

2.03
1.61
1.58
1.83
1.82
1.58

3.67
3.21
4.71
2.80
3.28
5.23

3.50
3.00
4.34
2.58
2.70
5.11

1.94
1.57
1.56
1.59
1.51
1.47

3.34
3.21
4.31
3.04
3.27
4.59

1.84
1.77
1.63
1.83
1.77
1.75

3.20
2.95
3.56
2.49
3.24
4.48

1.79
1.57
1.65
1.46
1.67
1.66

3.16
3.45
5.70
5.28
2.56
5.21

2.01
1.81
1.56
1.80
2.00
1.68

Table 2 Mean and standard deviation of the risk characteristics for each activity
These results (Table 2) revealed that the respondents perceived that a terrorist attack against an educational institution
would make them experience the greatest amount of dread (M=5.33) when compared to the other activities. Rioting,
however, would lead to the least amount of dread (M=4.19). As for the control over risk, the respondents indicated that
during a terrorist attack, they would not be able to avoid death or injuries (M=4.77). Burglary (M = 3.17), on the other
hand, were comparatively more controllable.
The respondents felt that the risk of all six criminal activities were in the neutral range (3.62 <M<4.30); however, a
terrorist attack (M=6.09) was found to be catastrophic. Terrorist attack (M=5.70) and murder (M=5.51) were considered
as having very severe consequence, while burglary (M=3.56) was seen as having the least consequence. Murder,
kidnapping, armed robbery, rioting and burglary were considered old types of risk (2.49<M<3.04), while terrorist attack
against an educational institution was considered a newer type of risk (M=5.28).
Two-dimensional spatial factor representation
A two-factor space dread and familiarity graph for the two participating cohorts (Figure 4) was plotted by averaging the
means of the risk characteristics. Factor 1 dread are risks which are increasingly judged to be less controllable,
increasing, more catastrophic and more involuntarily as you move from left to right of the graph. Factor 2 familiarity
risks judged to be known, an old risk and having immediate effect.
Murder (Student)
Murder (Security)
Kidnap (Student)
Kidnap (Security)
Armed Robbery (Student)
Armed Robbery (Security)
Rioting (Student)
Rioting (Security)
Burglary (Student)
Burglary (Security)
Terrorist Attack (Student)
Terrorist Attack (Security)

Unfamiliar Risk
5

4
3

4

5

3
Familiar Risk

Figure 4 Risk perception map for student and security personnel
Both cohorts indicated similar spatial results, with the students showing slightly higher unfamiliarity of risk and higher
dread risk for each of the activities than the security personnel. Nevertheless for terrorism, students indicated a
significant higher dread and greater unfamiliarity to risk when compared to the security practitioners. For example,
students had a significantly higher mean control over risk score (M=4.45) than the security personnel (M=3.67;
t(198)=4.226, p=.000) and a significantly higher mean severity of consequences score (M= 4.93) than the security
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personnel (M=4.45; t(198)=2.844, p=.005). On the other hand, the students had a significantly lower mean of risk score
(M=3.81) than the security personnel (M=4.25; t(198)=-2.773, p=.006).
The findings (Table 3) indicated that the students had significantly higher mean scores than the security personnel in all
activities. The student score for Murder (M=4.12) was higher than the security personnel (M=3.88; t(198)=2.374,
p=.019). Students also had a significantly higher mean kidnapping score (M=3.96) than the group of security personnel
(M=3.73; t(198)=2.044, p=.042). As for the terrorist attack, the students had a significantly higher mean terrorist attack
score (M=4.70) than the security personnel (M=4.45; t(198)=2.725, p=.007).
Activity

Murder
Kidnapping
Armed robbery
Rioting
Burglary (house breaking)
Terrorist attack

Student
(N = 100)
Mean
SD
.57
4.12
.70
3.96
.59
3.77
.75
3.90
.69
3.46
.57
4.70

Security practitioner
(N = 100)
Mean
SD
.83
3.88
.88
3.73
.77
3.67
.66
3.76
.67
3.45
.73
4.45

Table 3 Activity ratings across cohorts
The alpha coefficient for the 10 risk characteristics (Table 4) were moderate (0.695 to 0.886). According to Cohen, et
al. (2007, p. 506), these values indicated that the questionnaire was reliable and within the context of the study, for
measuring the risk characteristics and the overall perceived risk.
Risk Characteristic
Dread
Control over risk
Decrease vs. increase of risk
Individual vs. catastrophic
Voluntary vs. involuntary
Knowledge about risk
Severity of consequences
Old vs. new risk
Impact of risk
Perceived risk

Alpha
0.886
0.855
0.818
0.695
0.897
0.897
0.834
0.812
0.818
0.822

Table 4 Internal coefficient Alpha for risk characteristics (n=200)

THE PSYCHOMETRIC RISK MEASURE OF TERRORISM
The investigation describes the risk perceptions of lay people (student) and security practitioners (security personnel
working in the security fraternity) regarding terrorist attack against Singaporean educational institutions. This measure
was achieved by comparing the perceived risk of a terrorist attack against five other criminal activities, namely murder,
kidnapping, armed robbery, rioting and burglary (house breaking).
Risk perception of terrorist attack against educational institution
The first Research Question was designed to determine the risk perceptions of Singaporeans regarding terrorist attack
against educational institution. The findings of this study suggested that risk was perceived differently among the six
selected criminal activities. Therefore the participants perceived each criminal activity differently, perhaps as expected
that some criminal activities were perceived as riskier than others.
In the two-dimensional spatial factor representation (Figure 4), two factors labelled as factor 1 dread risk and factor 2
familiar risk were used to describe the perceptions of the whole sample regarding a terrorist attack against educational
institution against the other five criminal activities. For terrorist attacks dread risk was measured as high, resulting in a
perceived dread, lack of control, more catastrophic outcome and that exposure to such attacks mat perceived as
involuntarily. In addition, the perceived risk of terror attacks in the factor unfamiliar risk was measured as high, judged
to be an unfamiliar risk, unknown and a new risk, and that any effect may be delayed. Terrorist attack against an
educational institution was the only activity that scored higher than the neutral rating. It can thus be interpreted that
Singaporeans judged the risk of a terrorist attack against educational institution as a high dread risk and an unfamiliar
risk.
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Differences in the risk perception of terrorist attacks
The second Research Question was designed to determine whether there were any significant differences in the risk
perceptions between student (laypeople) and security personnel. Based on the findings (see Table 3), the study
concluded that risk perceptions differed significantly across students and security personnel in the area of risk control,
knowledge about the risk and the severity of risk consequences. However, risk perceptions did not differ significantly
across the two occupations for the dread or voluntariness of risk and whether the risk was old or new risk.
The study was able to conclude that the student perceived that the risk of a terrorist attack against an educational
institution was greater than that felt by the security personnel. This result concludes that the practitioners, in general,
rate risk lower than lay people, a view supported by past studies (Krause, Malmfors & Slovic, 1992; Barke & JenkinsSmith, 1993; Slovic, Malmfors, Krewski, Mertz, Neil & Bartlett, 1995; Lazo, Kinnell & Fisher, 2000; Gutteling &
Kuttschreuter, 2002). As Breakwell (2007, p. 71) concludes, there are substantial differences between lay and expert
views of risk, with experts generally rating risks lower.
The key result in this study indicated that although terrorist attacks against educational institution fall in the high dread
and unfamiliar risk quadrant, the mean score remained fairly close to the neutral point. This suggests that Singaporeans
perceived a fairly neutral sense of riskiness and concern that an attack by terrorist on educational institution could
occur. Such mentality could be due to the perception that Singapore is a relatively safe and orderly country, with low
crime rates when compared to the other neighbouring countries. Singapore has also been spared from the direct
experiences of terrorism that neighbouring countries like Indonesia and Philippines have had. In addition, that the
Singapore Government is perceived to be highly regarded as efficient and capable with various law enforcement
agencies having high trust level from the members of the public in preventing such incidents.

CONCLUSION
The study has demonstrated that the perception of a terrorist attack in Singapore is high, when compared against the
other measured risks. It is therefore pertinent to derive an effective risk communication strategy, devoting resources in
engaging the public in risk dialogue so that they are more aware of such risks. Government agencies dealing with
security risk management must know that they cannot properly reduce risk without first understanding how risk may be
perceived. For the terrorists, mass killings and damage to property are only one-part of a larger plan to intimidate and
paralyse the populace. Although each terrorist attack instils fear and intimidation, terrorists achieve some of their goals
of psychological impact through the threat of future attacks, rather than solely through attacks that have already
occurred. Although there has not been any terrorist attack against Singaporean educational institutions, it is still
important to understand how people perceived the threat of terrorism, so that policy-makers are better able to develop
national multi-layered defences against such risk.
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